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DIGNITY BY ANY OTHER NAME 
Erin Daly*
MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING (HARVARD UNIVERSITY 
PRESS 2018). PP. 200. PAPERBACK $15.50.
JEREMY WALDRON, ONE ANOTHER¶S EQUALS: THE BASIS OF HUMAN EQUALITY 
(BELKNAP PRESS OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2017). PP. 280.
HARDCOVER $29.95. 
,WLVDFXULRXVWKLQJWRUHDG5RVHQ¶VDQG:DOGURQ¶VUHFHQWERRNVWRJHWKHU
5RVHQ¶VEHDUVWKHVLPSOHEXWEURDGWLWOH³'LJQLW\´QDUURZHGQot at all by the subtitle 
³,WV+LVWRU\DQG0HDQLQJ´,WSURPLVHVWREHDZLGH-ranging sweep across time and space, 
and to deliver an answer that will finally give repose to the questions on the minds of many 
philosophers and lawyers these days: what does dignity actually mean? Why are we all 
talking about it all of a sudden? And what work can it actually do? If that is the implication 
IURP WKH WLWOH RI 5RVHQ¶V ERRN KRZHYHU LW RYHUSURPLVHV D EHWWHU VXEWLWOH PLJKW EH
Understanding Certain Specific Questions about Dignity, from the Catholic and German 
Perspectives. In fact, Rosen tells us that the book itself was spawned by a question from 
KLVIULHQG&KULVWRSKHU0F&UXGGHQ³WKHGLVWLQJXLVKHGKXPDQULJKWVODZ\HU´ZKRDVNHG
KLP³RQHGD\RYHUFRIIHHµZKDWGRSKLORVRSKHUVKDYHWRVD\DERXW³GLJQLW\´"¶´5RVHQ¶V
DQVZHUZDV³µ(UQRWYHU\PXFKWKDW,NQRZDERXW².DQWSHUKDSV"¶´1 This vignette not 
only provides the beginning of the story but the endpoint as well. This is not, it turns out, 
a world tour or a deep history; rather, in 160 short pages, it provides a very well-
constructed three-part philosophic argument that answers a particular mental challenge 
that Rosen has set for himself: Why, he wonders, should we respect the dead when they 
GRQ¶W NQRZ LI WKH\¶UH EHLQJ UHVSHFWed?2 In solving this puzzle, he develops a certain 
conception of dignity, one whose roots are firmly in the Kantian and Catholic traditions, 
and that focuses on the moral duty we owe to ourselves and to others to retain our 
humanity. 
Along the way, Rosen does raise certain important issues²what is the core meaning 
                                                          
ΎProfessor of Law, Delaware Law School, and Executive Director of Dignity Rights International.
 1. MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING ix (2018). 
 2. Id. at 10. 
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198 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:197 
RIGLJQLW\"+RZGRZHEDODQFHGLJQLW\¶VXQLYHUVDOLVPZLWKLWVDSSOLFDWLRQVLQSDUWLFXODU
situations and cultural contexts? Is dignity purely a secular concept or purely a religious 
concept, or is it both? Does human dignity exist before birth, or after death? These are 
LPSRUWDQW TXHVWLRQV VWLOO GHEDWHG WRGD\ VHYHUDO \HDUV DIWHU WKH SXEOLFDWLRQ RI5RVHQ¶V
ERRN,WLVXQIRUWXQDWHWKDW5RVHQGLGQ¶WKDYHWKHEHQHILWRIWKHVXUJHLQSKLORVRSKLFDODQG
legal thinking about dignity rights that has spread throughout the world in the years since. 
At times, Rosen seems completely in control of this difficult subject. He identifies 
IRXUVWUDQGVLQ³WKHFRQFHSWXDOPDNH-XSRIGLJQLW\´²1) rank or status of human beings as 
human beings, 2) the Kantian intrinsic value of moral law, 3) as measured and self-
possessed behavior, and 4) respectful treatment3²which become a bit of a leitmotif of the 
argument. But of these, the first is outmoded, having been made largely obsolete by the 
KXPDQULJKWVPRYHPHQW¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRWKHUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKHGLJQLW\RIDOORIKXPDQLW\
and the third and fourth strands may have more to do with decorum than with any serious 
sense of the word dignity as a legal or philosophic concept. Indeed, at times Rosen seems 
WRWUHDWKLVRZQFKRVHQWRSLFDVLI LW LVDVOLJKWFRQFHSWRI OLWWOH LPSRUW³>:@KDWLV OHVV
dignified than a two-year-ROG"´KHDVNV³2QHFRXOG,VXSSRVHDUJXHWKDWWKHFKLOGKDV
JUDFH%XWGLJQLW\"'HILQLWHO\QRW´4 But this misses the important point of dignity: only 
in a colloquial sense is it associated with how high we hold our heads or how stoically we 
bear our burdens. But in a philosophical and legal sense, it is so much more than that. It is 
not a mere question of strength of character, but the very source of all human rights, and 
perhaps their very purpose, and their means as well. Dignity is important precisely because 
every two-year-old has it exactly in the same way, for the same reasons, and to the same 
degree as does Rosen. The difficult philosophical question is why is that true? And the 
GLIILFXOWOHJDOTXHVWLRQLVKRZGRZHWKLQNDERXWULJKWVLQDZD\WKDWUHVSHFWVHDFKSHUVRQ¶V
equal dignity, without making a mockery of the obvious differences between Rosen and 
the two-year-old. 
5RVHQ¶V ERRN LV VR SOHDVDQWO\ FRQYHUVDWLRQDO RQH ZDQWV WR LQWHUMHFW DQG DVN
questions as the argument evolves, sometimes about his meaning or the direction of his 
argument and at other times about implications of his argument to current challenges and 
FRQWURYHUVLHV LIZHZRQGHU DERXW WKH DSSOLFDWLRQ RI GLJQLW\ WR WKRVHZKR GRQ¶W NQRZ
WKH\¶UHEHLQJEHQHILWHGDVGRHV5RVHQVKRXOGZHDOVREHFRQFHUQHGDERXWWKHGLJQLW\RI
future generations (and their entitlement to a planetary climate that would allow them to 
OLYH" ,I GLJQLW\ XOWLPDWHO\ VWDQGV IRU WKH UHFRJQLWLRQ RI WKH ³LQQHU NHUQHO RI LQWULQVLF
YDOXH´5 that every human being has, should we consider whether non-humans (such as 
animals or rivers) are endowed with comparable kernels of worth? More broadly, how do 
the four strands of dignity relate to current legal and political challenges? Are there other 
meanings of dignity that would help us resolve some of the questions that courts are 
continually faced with? For instance, the Constitutional Court of Germany²the court that 
gets the most attention from Rosen²has wrestled intently with the question of how to set 
a pension level, or a tax level, or a level of benefits for refugees such that people are able 
                                                          
 3. Id. at 114. 
 4. Id. at 77. 
 5. Id. at 147. 
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2020] DIGNITY BY ANY OTHER NAME 199 
to live with dignity.6 And many other courts around the world have also confronted, and 
managed, more complex aspects of dignity, such as the balance between free speech and 
protection of personal dignity of the targets of unwelcome speech, the living conditions of 
prisoners, the extent to which health care is related to our capacity to live with dignity in 
society with others, and so on. It is not obvious how these complex but important questions 
ILJXUHLQWR5RVHQ¶VGHVFULSWLRQRIWKHPHDQLQJRIGLJQLW\
2IFRXUVHZHVKRXOGQ¶WFULWLFL]Ha book because it answers some questions but not 
others; it is always and only for the author himself to define the scope of his book. But the 
conversational tone of the book²Rosen tells us that his purpose here is to try to persuade 
us, his readers, of his argument7²invites engagement, questioning, and perhaps disputes 
ZLWKWKHDUJXPHQWDVLIZHZHUHOLVWHQLQJWRKLVOHFWXUHDQGFRXOGQ¶WZDLWWRDVNTXHVWLRQV
DWWKHHQGEXWZKHQKHJHWVWRWKHHQGKHVLPSO\VD\V³WKDQN\RX´DQGZDONVRIIWKHVWDJH
But there is so much more to say! 
7KDQNIXOO\ZHKDYH:DOGURQWRJLYHXVPRUH:DOGURQ¶VERRNLVIDUPRUHDPELWLRXV
and far more wide-ranging. With Waldron, you have a sense that if something he writes 
does spark a question, he will get to it soon and give it more attention than even you 
thought it deserved. The book is the result of a series of six Gifford Lectures delivered at 
the University of Edinburgh in 2015, and it continues to be timely and thoughtful. 
:DOGURQ¶VERRN LV QRW E\ LWV WLWOH RU LWV RZQ VHOI-definition, about dignity. It is, 
UDWKHU DERXW EDVLF HTXDOLW\ ³WKH SULQFLSOH WKDW KROGV WKDW ZH KXPDQV GHVSLWH DOO RXU
GLIIHUHQFHV DUH WR EH UHJDUGHG DV RQH DQRWKHU¶V HTXDOV´8 Although he has written 
extensively and thoughtfully about dignity elsewhere,9 in this book, he says he confines 
KLVXVHRIKXPDQGLJQLW\DVKHKDVHOVHZKHUH³WRFRQFHSWLRQVWKDWDWWULEXWHDKLJKand
distinctive status to humans, a status that is supposed to contrast with the moral 
considerability of non-KXPDQDQLPDOV´10 ³+XPDQGLJQLW\´KHVD\VLQFRQWUDVWZLWKWKH
WKHVLV RI EDVLF KXPDQ HTXDOLW\ ³SUHVXSSRVHV DQ HTXDOLW\ RI ZRUWK RU VWDQGLQJ DPRQJ
humans, but it adds to that an additional stronger thesis²by which I mean a claim that 
requires further defense²about distinctive hXPDQZRUWK´11
$QG\HWGLJQLW\LVXQGHQLDEO\WKHVXEWH[WRI:DOGURQ¶VLQYHVWLJDWLRQVRPHWLPHVD
complement to basic equality, sometimes in contrast to it, but always there as a constant 
companion, the understated side-kick who may turn out to have more substance than the 
PDLQDWWUDFWLRQ$WWKHRXWVHWKHWHOOVXVWKDWKHEHOLHYHV³WKDWHDFKKXPDQOLIHDQGWKH
living of each human life has a high worth that is important and equal in the case of each 
SHUVRQ´12 7KLV GRHVQ¶W VHHP SDUWLFXODUO\ HOHJDQW WR PH Eut it does provide a decent 
ZRUNLQJGHILQLWLRQRIKXPDQGLJQLW\DQGLQ:DOGURQ¶VKDQGVLWJHWVWRWKHFRUHRIKLV
                                                          
 6. See, e.g., Bundesverfassunngsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 9, 2010, BVERFGE
125, 175 (Ger.) (concerning the fundamental right to the guarantee of a subsistence minimum that is in line with 
human dignity); BVerfG, July 18, 2012, GBERFGE 132, 134 (Ger.) (applying a fundamental right to the guarantee 
of a dignified minimum existence to German and foreign nationals who reside in the Federal Republic of 
Germany). 
 7.  ROSEN, supra note 1, at xv. 
 8. JEREMY WALDRON, ONE ANOTHER¶S EQUALS: THE BASIS OF HUMAN EQUALITY 1 (2017). 
 9. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK, AND RIGHTS (Meir Dan-Cohen ed., 2012). 
 10. WALDRON, supra note 8, at 3±4. 
 11. Id. at 4. 
 12. Id. at 2. 
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inquiry: what justifies this belief? 
Waldron discounts the place of dignity in his thinking: he says he considers dignity 
part of a cluster RIWHUPVDORQJZLWKEDVLFHTXDOLW\HTXDOZRUWKDQG'ZRUNLQ¶V³HTXDO
FRQFHUQDQGUHVSHFW´13 WKDWWRJHWKHUFRQVWLWXWH³DSRZHUIXOERG\RISULQFLSOH´ZKRVHD[HV
are both horizontal (entailing equality across all human persons, including the profoundly 
disabled, the amoral, and the immoral) and vertical (entailing a distinction between all 
humans at the top of the axis and all non-humans down the line).14 In later chapters, he 




But all of this maps directly on to the modern, global understanding of human 
dignity, a conclusion put into relief when Waldron and Rosen are read in tandem. What 
Rosen calls an intrinsic kernel of worth that resides in each person and what Waldron calls 
distinctive equality sound like a simple understanding of human dignity as it has been 
recognized in law over the last seventy years: the recognition of the inherent equal worth 
of every person, everywhere. 
This understanding of dignity, which is rooted in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR), is now recognized in more than ten international human rights 
instruments, in the foundational documents of the European Union, the Organization of 
American States, and the African Union, and in more than five-sixths of all national 
constitutions.17 Out of this positive law has emerged a vast global jurisprudence of dignity 
from courts around the world, particularly in the last twenty years: courts in Argentina, 
Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Italy, 
Israel, Kenya, Malawi, Mexico, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, and South Africa, among other 
countries as well as regional courts, have decided scores and in some countries hundreds 
of cases recognizing the foundational significance of human dignity as a guarantor of the 
equal worth of every human being. These cases arise out of an astonishing range of factual 
settings and raise claims concerning rights of association, freedom of speech, non-
discrimination rights, electoral rights, and rights relating to housing, education, pension, 
health, working conditions, a healthy environment and protection against climate change, 
prison conditions, procedural due process, sexual and gender identity, family unity, travel, 
and more.18 Although neither the codified nor the decisional law establishes a clear 
definition of human dignity, the overlapping consensus is exactly what Waldron calls 
GLVWLQFWLYHHTXDOLW\ILUVWZHPXVWUHFRJQL]HZKDWPDNHVDOOKXPDQEHLQJVRQHDQRWKHU¶V
                                                          
 13. Id. at 3. 
 14. Id.
 15. WALDRON, supra note 8, at 30. 
 16. Id. at 31. 
 17. See, e.g., James R. May & Erin Daly, Point of View: Why Dignity Rights Matter, 2 EUR. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 129 (2019); see Database of National Constitutions with Dignity Provisions (2019), 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1qTzxpkXyvnE3PTpj7PD8YwRF1IEsIQhzGMBNd3eWvxg/edit?usp=
sharing (last visited Oct. 9, 2019). 
 18. See ERIN DALY, DIGNITY RIGHTS: COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE WORTH OF THE HUMAN PERSON
(Rogers M. Smith & Mary L. Dudziak eds., 2013); ERIN DALY & JAMES R. MAY, GLOBAL DIGNITY RIGHTS 
CASEBOOK (W. S. Hein, forthcoming 2020). 
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2020] DIGNITY BY ANY OTHER NAME 201 
equals, despite differences within the human race in physical, mental, and moral capacities, 
inclinations, and accomplishments, and second, we must recognize that, despite these 
GLIIHUHQFHVZLWKLQKXPDQLW\PHPEHUVRI³WKHKXPDQIDPLO\´DVWKH8'+5VD\V19 are 
entitled to recognition of their worth in a way that distinguishes them from all beings who 
are not members of this distinctive family. 
Waldron gives us a few more clues to suggest that he is really interested in dignity 
ZUDSSHG XS LQ HTXDOLW\¶V FORWKHV +H DFNQRZOHGJHV WKDW GLVWLQFWLYH HTXDOLW\ ³LV RIWHQ
DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHSKUDVHµKXPDQGLJQLW\¶´DQGWKDW³>I@RUZKDWLWLVZRUWK,SHUVRQDOO\
DP D VWURQJ EHOLHYHU LQ GLVWLQFWLYH HTXDOLW\´20 And he uses the terms descriptive and 
³SRVLWLYHHYDOXDWLYH´RU³QRUPDWLYH´RU³SUHVFULSWLYH´WRGHVFULEHGLIIHUHQWZD\VZHPLJKW
think about our judgments about equality. Like courage, basic equality can partake of both: 
we observe equality and we believe it is good.21 From all of this (and many other 
references to dignity throughout the book), we can only conclude that he is a strong 
believer in human dignity both as a descriptive and prescriptive concept22 but that, 
nonetheless, he would rather leave dignity in the role of the sidekick and focus on equality, 
the star of the show. And to be clear, my purpose in focusing attention on the confluence 
of dignity and equality is not to suggest that they are identical or interchangeable qualities 
or concepts. They are not. But simply to say that the particular way in which Waldron is 
talking about equality (i.e. distinctive equality that treats all humans and only humans as 
RQHDQRWKHU¶VHTXDOVPDSVSHUIHFWO\RQWRWKHZD\WKDWFRXUWVDQGRWKHUVKDYHEHHQWDONLQJ
about human dignity. 23 It is a cost of intellectual disciplinism that philosophers like Rosen 
DQG:DOGURQGRQ¶WWDNHHQRXJKDFFRXQWRISKLORVRSKHU-jurists like Albie Sachs, Aharon 
Barak, Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, or the judges of the Colombian and German constitutional 
courts who have developed a deeply theorized and coherent jurisprudence of dignity.24
1RQHWKHOHVV:DOGURQ¶VERRNPDNHVUHIHUHQFHWRDQDUUD\ of philosophers, past and 
present, who have sought to understand these same questions. Some of this is well trodden 
ground, although even here, his insights are often fresh and thoughtful. Perhaps the most 
challenging part of his argument comes in the last lecture, when he considers the question 
(posed most provocatively by Peter Singer) of why people who are profoundly disabled 
VKRXOGEHUHFRJQL]HGDVWKHHTXDOVRIWKRVHZKRDUHQRW:DOGURQ¶VUHVSRQVHLVLQSDUW
WKDW³WKRVHZKRVHOLYHVDUHOLYHGZLWKLQ the ordinary range of human functioning have a 
basis for also recognizing as their brothers and sisters in human dignity those who have 
WKHVHPRUHFRPSOLFDWHGIHDWXUHVRIFRQVXPPDWHGIUDJLOLW\DQGKXPDQPLVIRUWXQH´25
Another response to the conundrum may simply be that specieism matters. We can 
think of this in two ways, one philosophic and one pragmatic (or intrinsic and extrinsic) 
but both suggested in earlier sections of the book. The intrinsic reason emerges out of 
                                                          
 19. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 20. WALDRON, supra note 8, at 31. 
 21. Id. at 64±65. 
 22. Id. at 41. 
 23. This also reflects the definition of dignity provided in the American Bar Association¶s recent affirmation 
³that human dignity²the inherent, equal, and inalienable worth of every person²is foundational to a just rule 
of law.´ Res. 113B, A.B.A. H.D. (2019). 
 24. See WALDRON, supra note 8, at 152±55 (discussing Barak¶s judgment in the torture case). 
 25. Id. at 251. 
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:DOGURQ¶V IRFXVRQ ORYH/RYH LVQRWan abstract quality like moral reasoning. Love is 
profound and emotive and defining. And I would guess that most people who have ever 
given birth or adopted a baby experience a love for their child that is not dependent on 
their child showing a capacity for moral reasoning or personal autonomy but that has 
everything to do with that child simply being a human being. (Many pregnant women 
experience nightmares of giving birth to a fish or some other non-human being, and it is 
not a happy dream!). We may be hardwired to love another human being simply by virtue 
RI WKDW EHLQJ¶V KXPDQLW\ LQ D ZD\ WKDW LQFOXGHV KXPDQV RI all shapes and sizes and 
potentialities but is far from the love we might feel for even the cleverest and most loyal 
dog. 
The other reason for accepting basic equality among all humans is more pragmatic. 
7KHRSSRVLWHLVZKDW:DOGURQFDOOV³VRUWDOVWDWXV´²that is, categorizing legal subjects on 
the basis of what sort of person they are.26 This is not, Waldron tells us, a good thing: it is 
the basis of racism, sexism, and every other form of discrimination and oppression most 
of us would now reject.27 But understanding why sorting people is wrong is the key to 
understanding why distinctive equality is right. The problem with sorting is that someone 
has to do it²someone has to decide which human beings are worthy and which are not²
or, as Waldron might say, where the limits of the range properly are: where is the line 
between abled, disabled, and profoundly disabled (and there is no universally accepted 
god who can accept this responsibility). Faced with this question, the drafters of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in the ruins of the Holocaust, resoundingly 
rejected this possibility. If there is no one who can be entrusted with drawing lines among 
human beings, then no lines can be drawn; the only conclusion is that all members of the 
KXPDQIDPLO\DUHERUQHTXDOLQGLJQLW\DQGULJKWVDQGWKXVDUHRQHDQRWKHU¶VHTXDOV
But Waldron is not trying to persuade us of a particular argument, but to lead us in 
a long and challenging hike in the intellectual woods of his mind. Along the way, we must 
FRQVLGHU ZKHWKHU SXUH ³UHDVRQPRUDO DJHQF\ SHUVRQDO DXWRQRP\ DQG WKH FDSDFLW\ WR
ORYH´28 individually or in combination, warrants treating all humans and only humans as 
RQHDQRWKHU¶VHTXDOV$WWKHHQGRIWKHGD\KRZHYHU:DOGURQIUDQNO\DGPLWVWKDWKHKDV
no clear answer to the conundrum of distinctive or basic equality. But that is ok²we had 
a very interesting time exploring. 
                                                          
 26. Id. at 7. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 217. 
